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THE ASSAULT ON INJURED VICTIMS' RIGHTS
BY RALPH NADER*
INTRODUCTION
It is doubtful whether there has been anything like the present at-
tack on injured victims' rights in the two hundred year history of the
American civil justice system. During the 1986 state legislative session,
forty-one states passed legislation to restrict the rights of innocent vic-
tims to sue, and to be fully compensated for their injuries. In a few
states, legislatures enacted across-the-board tort law changes overturn-
ing state common law which for generations had afforded harmed citi-
zens a means of challenging injustice and negligence.'
Insurance industry advertisements suggest that recent tort legisla-
tion is the necessary consequence of an unrestrained jury system - "ex-
orbitant awards and unpredictable results ' 2 which are not only crippling
the insurance industry, 3 but are, in the words of the insurance industry's
most powerful ally President Ronald Reagan, "eating away at the fabric
of American life.",
4
In almost every state, as well as in Congress, proposals abound to
restrict the rights of innocent victims to sue and to recover for their
injuries. These restrictions include: arbitrary caps on "pain and suffer-
ing" awards; 5 limitations on, or elimination, of punitive damage awards,
* B.A. Princeton, 1955; LL.B. Harvard, 1958. Mr. Nader is founder and director of
the Center for Study of Responsive Law (founded 1969). Attorney Joanne Doroshow pro-
vided research assistance for this article.
1. See Proffer, Coping With A Crisis, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Sept., 1986,
at 18.
2. INS. INFO. INST., THE LAWSUIT CRISIS (1986).
3. The insurance industry has undertaken a "massive effort to market the idea that
there is something wrong with the civil justice system in the United States." NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, Dec. 21, 1984, at 2. The goal, in the words of one of the industry's leading
spokespersons, GEICO's chairman John J. Byrne, is "to withdraw [from the market] and
let the pressure for reform build in the courts and in the state legislatures." J. CoM., June
18, 1985, at 10A, col. 1.
The insurance industry has funded a $6.5 million dollar advertising campaign to con-
vince the public a "lawsuit crisis" is responsible for the scarcity of affordable insurance
among certain individuals and businesses. J. Com., Mar. 19, 1986 at 1, col. 2. Magazine
and television ads include such captivating headlines as "The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad for
Babies," "Even Clergy Can't Escape the Lawsuit Crisis" and "The Lawsuit Crisis Is Penal-
izing School Sports."
4. President's Message to the American Tort Reform Association ("ATRA"), 22
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 720 (May 30, 1986) [hereinafter President's Message].
5. Under these provisions, a passenger who became a quadriplegic after a defec-
tively-designed jeep overturned, see Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D.
1979), and a person burned and permanently disfigured by an exploding Pinto gas tank, see
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), could
recover for only a fraction of their actual pain and suffering over a lifetime. Some caps
have been held unconstitutional. In striking down Virginia's $1.0 million legislative cap
on medical malpractice awards, a Virginia federal district court held:
[Tihe legislature may not mandate the amount of judgment to be entered in a
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which often serve as the only effective deterrent against intentionally un-
safe practices; 6 mandatory limits on contingency fees for plaintiff law-
yers, without corresponding limitations on the fees of defense lawyers;
7
modification or elimination ofjoint and several liability, which results in
penalizing the victim by precluding full recovery in the event a culpable
party is unable to pay;8 restrictions on lump sum payments; 9 repeal of
the collateral source rule;' 0 and relaxed liability standards, such as elim-
trial. Such a measure not only infringes upon the right to a jury where that right
applies, but, when considered in the light of the proper functioning of the legisla-
ture and the judiciary under our system of separation of powers of the respective
branches, it also impermissibly interferes with the function of the judicial branch,
thereby violating the separation of powers. Viewed in this light, [the cap] is
clearly unconstitutional.
Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 790 (W.D. Va. 1986).
6. Punitive damages are awarded only in the most serious cases where injury was
caused by a defendant's "aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice', or a fraudulent
or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of
the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton." W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (1984) [hereinafter KEETON]. For an example of statu-
tory limits on punitive damages, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(l)(a) (1986) which
provides:
In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a wrong done
to the person or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of is
attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct, the
jury, in addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, may award him
reasonable exemplary damages. The amount of such reasonable exemplary dam-
ages shall not exceed an amount which is equal to the amount of the actual dam-
ages awarded to the injured party.
7. Defense lawyers, paid by the hour, may be motivated to increase their hours by
conducting unnecessary discovery, filing frivolous motions, or refusing to participate in
meaningful settlement negotiations until immediately before trial. Plaintiff's attorneys,
usually paid on a contingency basis, have no such motivations because they are only com-
pensated upon recovery of a claim. Furthermore, access to legal services on a widespread
basis for non-wealthy individuals is made possible through the contingency fee system. See
generally Schmidt, Contingent Fee.- Key to the Courthouse, 92 CASE AND COMMENT 2 (1987).
,James L. Gattuso of the conservative Heritage Foundation pointed out that the con-
tingency fee system acts not only to provide injured persons who could not otherwise
afford legal representation with access to the legal system, but it helps screen out baseless
lawsuits. Gattuso, Don't Rush to Condemn Contingency Fees, Wall St. J., May 15, 1986, at 28,
col. 3.
8. Ifjoint and several liability is eliminated, any one wrongdoer's liability is limited
to the "proportion of harm" attributable to that person's misconduct. This would be un-
fair to the victim in the event that one wrongdoer cannot or will not pay for injuries he
helped to cause. The common law ofjoint and several liability has long recognized that it
is more fair to allow an innocent victim to fully and promptly recover for injuries suffered,
and to let the wrongdoers decide among themselves, after the victim is compensated, how
to apportion the liability. See KEETON, supra note 6, at 328, 475. Those arguing to elimi-
nate joint and several liability frequently overlook the fact that in virtually every jurisdic-
tion, a defendant may be held liable in the first place only if the defendant's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
(1965). Moreover, eliminating joint and several liability requires that a legal fiction be
introduced into the rules of compensation, by presuming it is possible to define precise
percentages of responsibility for an indivisible injury among several wrongdoers.
9. Provisions mandating that damage awards be allocated in periodic payments pe-
nalizes those victims who are faced with large medical costs immediately after an injury
and those who must make adjustments in transportation and housing. Periodic payments
allow insurance companies to pocket the interest earned while the funds remain in their
possession.
10. The collateral source rule serves to prevent a tortfeasor from reducing its liability
by payments that the injured party has received from sources collateral to the tortfeasor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1965) ("Payments made to or benefits con-
[Vol. 64:4
INJURED VICTIMS' RIGHTS
ination of strict liability in product liability actions.''
These measures are aimed at weakening the American civil justice
system which, for all its embrace of noble concepts of justice, still con-
fronts injured people with the difficult task of prevailing in court before
they may recover any compensation. Surveys indicate that these meas-
ures are not supported by the American people.' 2 Rather, they are part
of a legislative package advocated by various special interest groups: the
property/casualty insurance industry - seeking to enrich its already
large profits at the expense of innocent victims; the business and profes-
sional defendants' lobbies - seeking to immunize from suit the manu-
facturers of hazardous goods and toxic chemicals; and the Reagan
administration - pushing to federally regulate downward the decentral-
ized state judicial system that has provided injured victims with access to
justice for over 200 years. They call this package "tort reform," but it is
one of the most unprincipled public relations scams in the history of
American industry.
I. THE "INSURANCE CRISIS" MYTH
The "insurance crisis" has little to do with lawsuits, but everything
to do with a cyclical trend in the insurance industry. This "crisis" is a
self-inflicted phenomenon which last occurred in the mid-seventies, and
which invariably provokes frenetic talk of a litigation explosion and calls
for legislative limits on victims' rights. 13 The last cycle began several
ferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's
liability, although they cover all or part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.").
See, e.g., Folkestad v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 813 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1987).
Repeal of the collateral source rule means that payments taken from health insurance,
social security and other sources which have already been paid for by the consumer or
taxpayers, would be used to reduce a wrongdoer's financial responsibility for injuries to
consumers. This system provides a windfall to insurance companies, which have previ-
ously received payment of premiums from the victim.
11. The doctrine of strict liability ensures that the one who is responsible for bringing
a dangerously defective product into the marketplace or workplace compensates those in-
jured by the product. This approach maximizes incentives for making safer products.
Strict liability does not mean absolute liability. In a strict liability action an injured
victim still carries a heavy burden. He or she must prove: (1) the existence of a defect
which renders the product in question unreasonably dangerous; (2) the manufacturer's
responsibility for that defect; (3) the nature and extent of plaintiff's injury; and (4) the
causal connection between the defect and the injury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 395 comment b (1965). The additional proof requirements for recovery in product lia-
bility actions would increase the costs and evidentiary burdens, and generally make pursuit
of legal remedies more difficult for the average victim.
12. A nationwide poll conducted for one "tort reform" group, ATRA, shows that
while "[alt first glance the public appears receptive to a broad range of solutions to the
liability problem . . . focus group discussions reveal that this receptivity is easily reversed
when objections to reforms are raised." The Public Discusses the Liability Crisis, BURSON-MAR-
STELLER RES. at x (June 1986). When pushed to clarify what they really could support,
only two solutions could be agreed upon: "1. Educate the public on the proper use of the
civil court system; and 2. Impose penalties for frivolous or nuisance suits." Id. at xi. The
poll was conducted by interviewing a total of 1,002 American adults selected nationwide.
In addition, two focus group sessions were conducted involving twenty of the "influential
public," defined as heads-of-households with incomes of about $40,000 who voted in
1984. Id. at iii, iv.
13. J. Robert Hunter, Federal Insurance Administrator under Presidents Ford and
1988]
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years ago when interest rates were relatively high. Capitalizing on
higher interest rates, the industry lowered prices and insured poor risks
in order to obtain premium dollars which were then invested for maxi-
mum return. 14 When interest rates dropped, and investment income
decreased accordingly, the industry responded by sharply increasing in-
surance premiums and reducing the availability of coverage - a repeat
of their similarly mismanaged performance of the mid-seventies. In fact,
in all the controversy, there is remarkable agreement about the causes of
the insurance industry's problems.1 5 AJanuary 1987 editorial in Business
Week may have said it best in concluding that:
Even while the industry was blaming its troubles on the tort
system, many experts pointed out that its problems were
largely self-made. In previous years the industry had slashed
prices competitively to the point that it incurred enormous
losses. That, rather than excessive jury awards, explained most
of the industry's financial difficulties.
16
Even through the most recent downturn the industry continued to
make money. Their profits are now soaring. 1 7 Insurance company
Carter, and now President of the National Insurance Consumer Organization ("NICO"),
testified before Congress in 1986:
On November 3, the Washington Post editorialized that liability insurance or the
lack of it is becoming a national problem.... They went on to say that there must
be a limit to all this, that the real beneficiaries of this may be the lawyers, and
there has to be a better way of compensating those to whom reparations are due
than the clumsy and expensive mechanism that exists today. That editorial was
November 3, 1976, and that is my point. We are in a typical cyclical pattern of the
insurance industry which is driving prices skyward. This is the insurance cy-
cle .... [T]ypical bottoms were in 1965, 1975, and 1984 .... This .. .has gone
on since the early 1900's in fairly consistent patterns.
Costs and Availability of Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1986) (testimony ofJ. Robert Hunter,
President, National Insurance Consumer Organization) [hereinafter Hunter Testimony].
See also MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STUDY OF THE PROFITABILITY OF COMMER-
CIAL LIAB. INS., (Nov. 10, 1986) ("The property casualty industry is cyclical in nature.
Data show that the industry has had profitability cycles at least since the 1920's") [herein-
after MICHIGAN REPORT].
James B. Stradtner, general partner at investment bankers Alex Brown & Son, Inc.,
described the "boom and bust nature of the industry . . .as predictable as the tide in a
three-year swing from flow to ebb." J. OF COM., May 15, 1986, at 14A, col. 1. Stradtner
was also reported as saying that "the commercial insurance industry has an almost incur-
able penchant for 'shooting itself in the foot.' " Id.
14. See, e.g., Hunter Testimony, supra note 13, at 26 ("In the early eighties they were
writing the MGM Grand Hotel fire after the fire, [which was, in effect] retroactive liability
insurance. They lusted after the cash-flow [of] liability policies. When the interest rates
dropped, they lost their lust.")(emphasis added).
15. For example, Maurice R. Greenberg, President and Chief Executive Officer of
American International Group, Inc., one of this country's leading property/casualty com-
panies, told an insurance audience in Boston that the current industry problems were due
to price cuts "to the point of absurdity" in the early 1980's. Had it not been for these cuts,
Greenberg said, there would not be "all this hullabaloo" about the tort system. Green-
wald, Insurers Must Share Blame: AIG Head, Bus. INS., Mar. 31, 1986, at 3.
16. What Insurance Crisis?, Bus. WE., Jan. 12, 1987, at 154. See also, e.g., NEW MEXICO
STATE LEGISLATURE, REPORT OF THE INTERIM LEGISLATIVE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMM. ON LIABILITY INSURANCE AND TORT REFORM (Nov. 24, 1986); MICHIGAN REPORT,
supra note 13; INSURANCE COMM. PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE CRISIS IN PENNSYLVANIA (Sept. 29, 1986).
17. The property/casualty insurance industry estimates that its income after taxes for
[Vol. 64:4
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stocks are booming on the New York Stock Exchange, and investment
analysts and brokers recommend casualty insurance stock for
investment. 1 8
Coming out of their bottom year of 1984, the insurance industry, in
conjunction with their foreign reinsurers, 19 saw a great opportunity to
limit their own future payout obligations by exploiting the business
community's natural eagerness for additional limitations on liability
from lawsuits. So they began dramatically increasing premiums and re-
ducing coverage, and arbitrarily cancelling policies of daycare centers,
small businesses, and local governments.
2 0
When businesses, professionals and governmental entities pro-
tested, the insurers proclaimed, "Don't look at us. It's those courts,
those juries, those verdicts, those lawyers." And instead of saying,
"Well, can you prove that?", these frustrated groups blindly accepted
their insurers' rationale, and joined in lockstep with them to forge a
powerful new lobby designed to fight for measures which would further
limit their own liability for the damage they caused innocent victims. 2 1
Aimed in the direction of Congress and the state legislatures, this
coalition of insurance companies and corporate defense lobbies has re-
lied on misinformation and anecdotal cases 22 to attack and destroy de-
1986 totalled $11.5 billion. Green, P/C Insurers Turned a Profit Last Year, J. OF CoM.,Jan. 6,
1987, at 1, col. 2.
Between 1976 and 1985, the property/casualty companies had a net gain of about
$81.0 billion on which they paid no federal income tax, according to the General Account-
ing Office. See The Liability Insurance Crisis, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabiliza-
tion, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986)
(statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division) [hereinafter
Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings].
18. See, e.g., Curran, Bargains Beckon in Insurance, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1986, at 217; Ana-
lysts Bullish On Insurer Stocks, Bus. INS., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1.
19. Reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies. The insurer pays the reinsurer
a premium, in exchange for which the reinsurer agrees to share the risk with the insurer.
Just as primary insurers have been raising the premiums they charge their insureds, rein-
surers have been raising the premiums they charge the primary insurers. An independent
study for the Michigan House of Representatives found that "reinsurance serves to amplify
the [insurance] cycle." MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
20. A study based on a questionnaire to insurance companies, released June 9, 1986
by Rep. Peter W. Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, demonstrates that
the liability insurance industry actually paid out far less in claims than it received in premi-
ums over the past decade, "undermin[ing] the companies' claims of massive losses and
rais[ing] the specter of price-gouging and bloated profits." Address by Rep. Peter Rodino,
Press Release (June 9, 1986).
21. At a January 17, 1986 press conference, a number of business, professional and
insurance trade organizations announced the formation of ATRA whose sole agenda is to
change this country's civil justice system.
Former Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti resigned as ATRA's general counsel
on October 28, 1986, after ATRA made "outrageous and untrue" statements about Amer-
ican lawyers. A TRA Counsel Quits Over Negative Remarks About Lawyers, MEALEY'S LITIGATION
REP. NAT'L TORT REFORM, Dec. 2, 1986, at 914.
22. Several victims whose stories have been distorted repeatedly in public statements
by tort-reform proponents were brought before a congressional committee in an attempt
to clear the record regarding their cases. See Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17.
For example, Charles Bigbee, whose leg was severed after a car hit a phone booth in which
he was trapped (the door jammed after he noticed the car coming towards him), testified:
I believe it would be very helpful if I could talk briefly about my case and show
1988]
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cades of slow but careful progress made by state court after state court
respecting the physical integrity of human beings against harm.2 3 The
coalition is out to convince lawmakers to view this progressive evolution
not as a source of national pride, or as a source of public recognition
that the weak and the defenseless sometimes get justice, but rather as a
source of shame, as a source of economic destructiveness, as something
that should be stopped.
II. THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF UNPREDICTABILITY KEEPS OUR TORT
SYSTEM STRONG
The fundamental message of this special interest coalition is that
the jury system is out of control because of the unpredictable nature of
the common law and ofjury awards. 24 Insurance companies dislike the
civil jury system because they dislike a system in which they cannot pre-
cisely budget liability as a cost of doing business.
It is this "cost unpredictability", separate from the gradual evolu-
tion of liability principles over the generations, which constitutes the
very essence of deterrence - a function of the civil justice system which
is equally important to compensating the victim, and which cannot be
quantified in dollars and cents. The common law of torts reflects and
renews ethical and humane traditions which have led to the deterrence
of unsafe practices, the disclosure of potential hazards to a wider public,
and authoritative expansions of respect for human life which serve to
distinguish our country from most other nations.
Our tort system provides several invaluable functions. It is the
means of protection for tens of millions of Americans who are less likely
to be injured because of the impact of lawsuits brought by prior victims.
The prospect of tort liability deters those manufacturers, builders, doc-
tors and other tortfeasors from repeating their negligent behavior; it
provides them with a proper economic incentive to curb their damaging
practices and to make their endeavors more safe.2 5 Tort actions, when
how it has been distorted not only by the President, but by the media as well.
That is probably the best way to show that people who are injured due to the fault
of others should bejustly compensated for the damages they have to live with the
rest of their lives.
Id. at 45.
23. As Prosser noted, in the tort system "change and development have come as so-
cial ideas have altered, and they are constantly continuing." KEETON, supra note 6, at 19.
24. For example, one industry piece states, "[w]ith no way to gauge the risk of a law-
suit or amount of a potential court award, many businesses, professionals, municipalities,
manufacturers, and individuals are exposed to enormous unpredictability that makes it
difficult to do business." The Lawsuit Crisis, INS. INFO. INST. (1986).
25. According to Prosser,
The "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been quite impor-
tant in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of
the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the
courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there
is of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infre-
quently one reason for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing
that incentive.




reported to millions of people through the mass media, increase public
awareness about harmful products, dangerous drugs, toxins and unsafe
practices and processes. The system functions to alert citizens to take
their own precautions, and to inform regulators and legislators as to the
advisability of broader safety laws and stronger safety standards for the
prevention of harm.
2 6
Finally, the civil justice system provides our society with the moral
and ethical fiber that establishes the proper duties and obligations be-
tween parties in the marketplace, the workplace, the government and
the community. The sources for these basic ethical/legal principles
elaborating government and corporate accountability are the trial courts
and appellate courts. The decisions of these courts establish limits, du-
ties and rights to protect workers from employers, consumers from sell-
ers, communities from corporations, citizens from governmental entities
and future generations from present recklessness. Judicial decisions
sow the seed of civilized behavior.
III. A CAMPAIGN OF MISINFORMATION
Why is the insurance industry so disturbed by this sensitive system?
Why do they advocate taking judgment away from the judge and jury
who hear the evidence and who have no personal stake in the outcome?
Why do they propose to replace judicial determination with a codified
system of compensation rates which can be later altered with the corrup-
tive monies of political action committees and the special interest influ-
ence-peddling that often reaches the ears and pockets of legislators?
2 7
The answer must be premised on data. But the insurance industry relies
on alarmist, prejudicial, and sometimes unsubstantiated, data and
surveys which either belie credulity or are so manipulated and inter-
preted by the insurance lobby as to more closely resemble fiction than
fact. Often the insurance industry ignores reliable compilations of sta-
tistics which indicate that the American tort system is not out of control.
We know from data around the country that machines break and
chemicals burn their victims and that the cost of the casualty count in the
workplace and marketplace runs into the millions of dollars annually. 28
We also know that the auto, drug, chemical and other industries which
now seek greater protection from liability have been successfully taken
to court over and over again for seriously injuring the American public
with defective or toxic products, and that as a result of these lawsuits,
once dangerous products have been made safer or removed from the
26. For example, 20 years ago, United States Senator Gaylord Nelson, relying upon
data and sworn testimony from a 1965 lawsuit brought by an injured plaintiff against a
major tire manufacturer, sponsored legislation which resulted in the establishment of min-
imum tire performance safety standards. See 112 CONG. REC. 9614 (1966) (statement of
Sen. Nelson).
27. See generally Note, Curbing Injurious PAC Support Through 2 U.S.C. § 441d, 35 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 869 (1984).
28. D. BOLLIER &J. CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM HARM; THE CIVILIZING INFLUENCE OF
HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 163 (1986).
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marketplace altogether. 29
However, only a very small fraction of these injured Americans ac-
tually reach the courtroom,3 0 and only about half of those who obtain
jury verdicts receive or collect any compensation. This is the sober real-
ity - even according to figures released by Jury Verdict Research
("JVR"), the legal publishing firm whose figures are widely used by the
insurance industry, the United States Justice Department and other sup-
porters of "tort reform" to demonstrate a "lawsuit crisis."
3 1
In addition, statistics relied upon by tort reform proponents have
often been misused or misstated, and many have been substantially dis-
credited. 3 2 For example, compilations of data from the federal courts
are frequently cited to evidence a United States tort litigation explo-
29. Among the well-known products which have been removed from the market are:
The Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, manufactured by A.H. Robins (see M. MiNTz, AT
ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1979)); the Ford Pinto
exploding gas tank (see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1981)); and asbestos (see P. BRODEAU, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS IN-
DUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)).
Further, a recent survey of risk managers of 232 major U.S. corporations by the Con-
ference Board, an industry group, found that product liability suits have had a minor im-
pact on revenues, market share, and employee retention. Rather, the study found:
Where product liability has had a notable impact - where it has most signifi-
cantly affected management decision making - has been in the quality of the
products themselves. Managers say products have become safer, manufacturing
procedures have been improved, and labels and use instructions have become
more explicit.
Product Liability, The Corporate Response, CONF. BOARD (1987). See also, Lambert, Suing for
Safety, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at 48 (lawsuits are effective in eliminating defective products).
30. In a recent study, University of Wisconsin Professor Marc Galanter found that
only a small portion of troubles and injuries become disputes and only a small portion of
these become lawsuits. Of those that do, the vast majority are abandoned, settled or rou-
tinely processed without full-blown adjudication. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Dis-
putes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think 11e Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5, 26 (1983). Galanter found that "a sizable minority
- probably less than one-fifth - of American adults have sometime in their lives been a
party to civil litigation." Id. at 21. Galanter's work in this area has been described as a
"masterpiece in the field of social research on law," Wall St.J., May 28, 1986, at 37, col. 3.
31. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT]. Ac-
cording toJVR, "the plaintiff recovery rate [was] 60%; 26 years ago it was also 60%... the
rate is well under 50%." Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 360 (testimony
of Philip J. Hermann, Chairman ofJVR).
32. A May 1986 report by the Ad Hoc Insurance Committee of the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General concluded:
[T]he major assumptions and conclusions underlying the Justice Department Re-
port ... are substantially unsupported by the facts. The facts do not bear out the
allegations of an "explosion" in litigation or in claim size, nor do they bear out
the allegations of a financial disaster suffered by property/casualty insurers today.
They finally do not support any correlation between the current crisis in availabil-
ity and affordability of insurance and such a litigation "explosion." Instead, the
available data indicate that the causes of, and therefore the solutions to, the cur-
rent crisis lie with the insurance industry itself.
AD HOc INSURANCE COMM. OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY
OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, at 45 (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT]. See also,
Farrel & Glaberson, The Explosion In Liability Lawsuits is Nothing But a Ilyth, Bus. WK., Apr.
21, 1986 at 24.
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sion, 33 yet only approximately five percent of all tort filings are in fed-
eral court. 34 Increases in these filings largely can be explained by
removals from state courts, and by a few epidemic product liability cases
involving less than a dozen particularly dangerous products, such as as-
bestos, which have been the subject of recent litigation by thousands of
injured persons. 3 5 The best available evidence demonstrates that state
courts are not experiencing a litigation explosion.
3 6
Jury verdict data released byJVR is also frequently cited as support
for the insurance industry's position.3 7 However, according toJVR's re-
cent studies and JVR's chairman, Mr. Philip J. Hermann, this data does
not substantiate any claim of recently escalating jury awards. 38 This is,
33. The JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT cites a 758% increase in product liability filings
in federal courts between 1974 and 1985 as evidence of a "litigation explosion." JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45.
Professor Galanter commented on the use of federal court data:
The only systematic empirical base that played a role in... formulations [of a
litigation explosion] was the statistics on the growth of caseloads in the federal
courts, including the growth of appeals. Typically, only gross figures on filings
were cited. The fact that little of this was full-blown adjudication was ignored. It
was often assumed that what was going on in federal courts was typified by large,
highly visible cases. It was further assumed that one could generalize from what
was happening in the federal courts to what was happening in courts gener-
ally .... The literature displays little effort to offset these biases of perspective.
But beginning with Barton's 1975 article [Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27
STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975)], there is a strong admixture of naive speculation and
undocumented assertion. Appearing in prominent law reviews, publications in
which, notwithstanding their prestige, there is no scrutiny for substantive, as op-
posed to formal, accuracy, these polemics were quickly taken as authority for what
they asserted.
Galanter, supra note 30, at 62.
Galanter explained that those who erroneously have cited federal court data as the
"scholarly foundation" of a litigation explosion tend to be "a narrow elite of judges
(mostly federal), professors and deans at eminent law schools, and practitioners who prac-
tice in large firms and deal with big clients about big cases .. . [who] have a limited and
spotty grasp of what the bulk of the legal system is really like." Galanter, supra note 30, at
61.
34. See, e.g., Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 169 (testimony of Robert
T. Roper, Director, Court Statistics and Information Management Project, National
Center for State Courts).
35. Id. at 301-06.
36. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF AVAIL-
ABLE CIVIL AND CRIMINAi. TREND DATA IN STATE TRIAL COURTS FOR 1978, 1981 AND 1984
(1986). The findings on torts filings are of particular interest. The increase in tort case
filings between 1978-81 was only two percent, while the population for those states grew
four percent during the same time period. Between 1981 and 1984 the population grew
another four percent while tort filings increased seven percent. For the entire period
1978-84 total tort filings increased nine percent. The population increased by eight
percent.
"IT]here is not one shred of evidence to indicate that there is a litigation explo-
sion in the State court system," and "I do not know where Mr. Willard [of the
Justice Department] would gather that information, but we do not have it at the
National Center for State Courts, and we are the clearing house for all the
information."
Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 169 (testimony of Robert T. Roper).
37. See, e.g., JusTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 31.
38. JVR figures demonstrate that the rate of increase ofjury awards has declined since
1981. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., INJURY VALUATION, CURRENT AWARD TRENDS 6
(1986) [hereinafter INJURY VALUATION]. JVR Chairman Philip Hermann has testified that:
[O]ur studies do not support any claim of recently escalating jury verdict awards. The
apparent reason for this erroneous impression is that a number of highly publicized news
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
in part, due to JVR's methodology. JVR data, cited by industry, does
not reflect inflationary adjustments, and does not factor in settlements,
verdicts lowered on appeal, remittiturs, bench verdicts, verdicts for de-
fendants, or verdicts involving no money.3 9 Moreover, JVR's "average
jury award" figures are misused when cited to represent trends since
these averages ignore "zero" verdicts and are heavily influenced by a
few large ones. 40 "Median" figures are the correct measurement of typi-
cal awards, 4 1 and the median jury verdict has remained at approximately
$8,000 in 1979 dollars since 1959.42
JVR figures are also used by tort reform proponents to demonstrate
a surge in million-dollar-plus verdicts. 43 According to JVR figures, over
the last twenty-five years there have been 2,564 million-dollar verdicts,
many of which were settled for lower sums prior to appeal. 44 The claim
is made that in the biggest democracy and economy in the world, this is
some sort of scandal.
SinceJVR figures are not adjusted for inflation, they do not account
for the fact that the dollar today buys what thirty-nine cents purchased
in 1969. And byJVR's admission, the rate of increase of million-dollar
awards is slowing down. 45 Aside from this, in an economy with a $4.2
articles quoting our statistics, have grossly misstated them. Liability Insurance Crisis Hear-
ings, supra note 17, at 346-47.
39. See Localio, Variations on $962,258: The Misuse of Data on Medical Malpractice, L.,
MED. & HEALTH CARE, June 1985, at 126. Localio is the Director of Research at the Risk
Management Foundation owned by Harvard University and the hospitals affiliated with
Harvard Medical School.
40. Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note 17, at 594 (statement of A. Russell Lo-
calio).
When questioned aboutJVR's 1985 $1.8 million average product liability jury verdict
figure, repeatedly cited by tort reform proponents (see, e.g., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT,
supra note 31, at 36; President's Message, supra note 4), JVR Board Chairman Hermann
states that the figure "is the result of a lot of huge verdicts that distort the average, and as
a result those are unreliable figures to quote." Liability Insurance Crisis Hearings, supra note
17, at 185 (testimony of Philip J. Hermann).
Similarly, JVR had reported the 1978 average jury verdict for product liability to be
$1.7 million, up from $400,000 the year before and $800,000 the year after. After person-
ally calling JVR to ask them why the jump, I discovered that it was because of a single,
$127 million verdict in the case ofGrimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). In that case, the plaintiff was a thirteen-year-old child, who was a
passenger in a Ford Pinto which was hit in a rear-end crash and resulted in a gas tank
explosion. The plaintiff was burned over 90% of his body. Evidence was introduced at
trial which demonstrated that Ford management knew the tanks were defective, yet chose
not to recall the cars "based on the cost savings which would inure from omitting or delay-
ing the 'fixes.' " 119 Cal. App. 3d at 777.
The judge, in denying Ford's post-trial motions, reduced the award to $3.5 million.
119 Cal. App. 3d at 772. The verdict was upheld on appeal. The JVR figure did not take
into account this remittitur.
41. Localio, supra note 39, at 127.
42. The $8,000 figure was noted by Gustave Shubert in 1986. Address by Gustave
Shubert, Director, Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice, before the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colorado (Jan. 4, 1986); Peterson & Priest, THE
CIVILJURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (Rand
Corporation Institute for Civil Justice 1982).
43. See ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 36-39.
44. INJURY VALUATION, supra note 38, at 14.
45. INJURY VALUATION, supra note 38, at 29.
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trillion Gross National Product in 1985, 2,564 million-dollar verdicts
over a twenty-five year period is a scandal in reverse. Given the horren-
dous nature and tremendous volume of injuries and illnesses resulting
from corporate wrongdoing alone, there should have been more such
awards.
While the available evidence indicates that courts are not experienc-
ing a litigation explosion, 4 6 the debate is bound to continue until insur-
ance companies release information in their possession showing actual
payments to injured persons.4 7 One suspects that if the insurance in-
dustry could substantiate their claims that people are paid too much for
their injuries, they would have revealed that data long ago. Until the
insurance industry furnishes this information, its allegations of excessive
damage payments and its drive to drastically increase premiums must be
viewed as a commercial strategy borne out of the industry's cyclical fi-
nancial mismanagement of recent years.
IV. SPECIOUS HOPES: REDUCED PREMIUMS, INCREASED AVAILABILITY
According to the insurance industry, two of the purported benefits
of "tort reform" were to be a reduction in the price of insurance premi-
ums and an expansion in the availability of insurance coverage. These
claims were misfounded and misleading. Changing liability laws will not
reduce premiums. As a matter of fact, leading property/casualty compa-
nies have filed rate documents notifying state insurance commissioners
that even extensive "tort reforms" will not reduce insurance rates. 4 8 Con-
versely, a survey of insurance departments by the National Insurance
46. See supra notes 32, 33, 36, and 40.
47. J. Robert Hunter commented that:
If the insurance companies have data that juries are running wild with their
awards, why don't the companies come forward with it? Don't they have the bur-
den of proof if they want to take away our rights? The insurance companies sim-
ply refuse to put forth the data to let us analyze it. We've been asking since last
September, Where's the data?
Sherrill, One Paper That Wouldn't Shut Up, NATION, May 17, 1986, at 688 (quotingJ. Robert
Hunter).
48. Two leading property/casualty companies - Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. and
St. Paul Marine Insurance Co. - recently filed rate documents notifling Florida's insur-
ance commissioner that even extensive "tort reforms" will not reduce insurance rates.
NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., "FORT REFORM" A FRAUD, INSURERS ADMIT (1986). Filings
which calculate the effect of the 1986 Florida tort reform law, were made by 104 insurers
licensed in Florida. Out of 277 filings, 175, or 63%, showed no savings from tort reform.
while none showed savings of more than 10%; see also NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., TORr
REFORM WILL NOT REDUCE INSURANCE RATES, SAY 100+ FLORIDA INSURERS (1986).
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. notified the Kansas Insurance Department that re-
strictingjoint and several liability and limiting punitive damages would have no impact,
while capping for pain and suffering would reduce rates by no more than one percent.
Great American West, Inc., told the Washington Insurance Department that tort reform
could well raise rates.
"'he Insurance Services Office, the insurance industry group that issues 'advisory'
rates, said its advisory rates would not reflect any reduction due to tort reform, and em-
phasized to its member companies that 'any beneficial effects of tort reform cannot be
quantified with any degree of accuracy.' "
See also Toit-reform legislation: Did state get 'suckered', The Seattle Times. July 1. 1986, at
1, col. I .
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Consumer Organization indicates that access to insurance is increasing
in states where tort reform was not enacted.
49
It also appears doubtful that changing liability laws will increase the
availability of insurance. In many jurisdictions the opposite is
happening.
In 1978, for example, Pennsylvania enacted a law immunizing all
Pennsylvania municipalities from most kinds of liability suits and limit-
ing liability for even catastrophic events to $500,000 per occurrence,
50
yet Pennsylvania cities and towns are still having their insurance policies
cancelled. 5 1
In Iowa, lawmakers abolished joint and several liability as applied to
defendants who were less than fifty percent at fault for all cases tried
afterJuly 1, 1984.52 Still in late 1985, forty-one Iowa counties had their
liability insurance cancelled.
5 3
In Ontario, Canada, most "tort reform" measures sought by the in-
surance industry are already law. These measures include caps on
awards for pain and suffering, restrictions on the award of punitive dam-
ages and prohibition of contingency fees. 54 In addition, Ontario court
rules require any unsuccessful plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs.
There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in Canada, so most trials
are before judges.5 5 Yet the insurance industry is raising premiums for
many of its customers by 400% or more, cancelling coverage in mid-
term and refusing to provide coverage at any price.
56
Massive premium gouging, arbitrary cancellations and reduced cov-
erage will be the cyclical pattern and industry strategy of the future un-
less the real causes of this insurance crisis - the cash-flow underwriting
practices of the insurance industry - are addressed. Stop the surge and
decline in this cycle and the trauma on the economic system will end,
and the attack on victims' rights will atrophy.
V. PRESCRIPTION FOR REMEDY: SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
INSURANCE INDUSTRY REFORM
There is no doubt that reform is imperative if this insurance crisis is
to be abated. However, it is not the rights of victims which must be
evaluated and controlled, it is the unharnessed and grossly unscru-
49. NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., SIX INSURANCE INDUSTRY FIBS (1986).
50. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8501 - 8528 (1978).
51. See PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMM., HEARING ON MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE, SEPTEMBER 24, 1985, REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY OF TESTI-
MONY (1985).
52. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1986).
53. Statement of Iowa State Sen. Lowell Junkins, before the Florida Senate Com-
merce Comm. (Jan. 7, 1986).
54. See MINISTRY OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM., REPORT
ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 62, 74-78 (1979).
55. Id. at 74, 102-04.
56. See, e.g. ,Liability Coverage Crunch May Shut Day-Care Agencies, Toronto Star, Aug. 1,




tinized insurance industry itself that should be investigated and re-
formed. The special privileges enjoyed by the insurance industry are
largely responsible for the insurance crisis cycle. By virtue of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act,5 7 the insurance industry is exempt from antitrust
laws. 58 It is also exempt from federal regulation and Federal Trade
Commission scrutiny. 59 These exemptions should be repealed by
Congress.
60
In addition, Congress should establish a federal office of insurance
to monitor the industry and to establish standards for state regulators to
follow. A national industry-funded reinsurance program should be es-
tablished to compete with foreign reinsurers so as to exert downward
pressure on reinsurance rates and thus enable insurers to reduce their
rates.
At the state level, effective insurance disclosure laws are critical. In-
surance companies must be required to routinely disclose in detail and
by subline - for day care centers, trucking concerns, municipalities and
similar institutions - how much they take in from premiums and invest-
ment income and how much they pay out for verdicts and settlements,
reserves and other expenditures. States should also establish joint un-
derwriting authorities to provide insurance at actuarially sound rates to
those who cannot get insurance in the open market during insurance
cycle bottoms.
State insurance departments must be afforded more authority to
regulate rates, and state laws should provide for greater consumer rep-
resentation before insurance regulatory bodies. This would include es-
tablishment of state consumer advocates to directly intervene in rate
proceedings as many states now authorize in utility matters.6 ' State in-
surance departments also need greater funding and increased staffing.
6 2
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 - 1015 (1982).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1982). This section provides that the Robinson-Patman Act
"shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof." Accord-
ingly, the matter of regulation is left to state government. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982). This
section provides that: "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business." The law does retain, however, a prohibition against boycotts, coercion
and intimidation. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982). See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry,
438 U.S. 531 (1978) (insurance companies may not boycott their insureds by agreeing to
deny them coverage entirely).
59. 15 U.S.C. 1012(b) (1982) provides that: "No act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulat-
ing the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ... "
60. For a discussion on the merits of repealing these exemptions, see Glover It's Time
to Repeal McCarran-Ferguson, I ANTITRUST 31 (1987).
61. For example, New Jersey's law authorizes the New Jersey Public Advocate to inter-
vene on consumers' behalf. The cost of intervention is billed back to the insurance com-
pany seeking the rate increase. 52 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-1 - 52:27E-19 (West 1986).
62. State insurance departments are lacking in investigators, auditors and other pro-
fessionals and cannot effectively recommend the appropriate levels of insurance rates.
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE
REGULATIONS OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS (1979); see also American Academy of Actuaries,
1986 Yearbook (Nov. 1, 1985). There are only 64 actuaries employed by state insurance
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Insurance companies should be required to engage in greater loss
prevention efforts as well as improvement of health and safety condi-
tions. Presently, some insurance companies are ignoring hazards.
When an insurer knows that a claim is legitimate because of a well-
known specific hazard, the logical approach is not to cancel coverage,
raise rates or limit recovery. The solution is to pay the claim, go back to
the insured and make a hazard analysis of the product or unsafe circum-
stance, and then refuse to continue coverage until all hazards uncovered
by the analysis are eliminated or the risk of injury is reduced by specific
safeguards and warnings. Instead, the insurer typically ends up defend-
ing the hazard so as to shift liability to another party, and as a result,
often avoids paying the claim, thereby reducing monetary loss for itself
and its insured.
In addition, the absolute immunities enjoyed by employers under
worker compensation laws gives employers little incentive for hazard
prevention. In many circumstances the absolute immunity granted em-
ployers under workers compensation laws allows insured employers to
violate recognized hazard prevention measures with disregard for the
lives and safety of their employees.
63
Insurance companies should also participate in experience loss rat-
ing, 64 and should be required to disclose evidence of defective products
or hazardous conditions to the appropriate law enforcement and regula-
tory authorities.
Our industrial society produces diverse benefits but it also exposes
many people to avoidable injury and disease. Society is not harmed
when the rights of injured people are vindicated and when they are com-
pensated - not as chattel - but as respected and dignified human be-
ings. Society and its unafflicted citizens benefit from such justice and
from the corresponding deterrence of careless or unsafe behavior.
The insurance industry has looked for scapegoats - victims, law-
yers, juries and judges - to cover up its own instability and mismanage-
ment. Giving up basic victims' rights will not stop premium gouging
and policy cancellations. Only effective insurance reforms will stop the
cyclical insurance crisis which leads to the volcanic eruptions of premi-
ums, and the reduced availability of insurance coverage in the business,
departments and 26 states have no actuary on staff. Aetna Insurance Company alone em-
ploys twice as many actuaries as all the states combined.
63. Bohyer, The Exclusivity Rule: Dual Capacity and the Reckless Employer, 47 MoNT. L.
REV. 157 (1985).
64. Many professionals and small businesses pay a set rate regardless of their individ-
ual claims experience. For example, competent and conscientious doctors are unjustly
paying the substantial price of a minority of seriously incompetent, careless, undertrained
or disabled physicians.
A 1985 report to Michigan Governor James Blanchard by former University of Michi-
gan President Robin W. Fleming found that for claims filed between 1976 and 1984,
"2.5% of physicians accounted for 19.7% of all claims and 19.3% of physicians accounted
for 72.2% of all claims." A study by the Orlando Sentinel reported that in Florida, "3
percent of doctors were responsible for 48% of the malpractice claims paid in the state
between 1975 and 1984. One doctor had 34 paid claims. Four others had 10 or more paid
claims." Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 19, 1986 at 1.
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professional and non-profit sectors. Increasing the number of obstacles
injured or sick citizens must overcome in the already difficult process of
prevailing in court is not a solution; it is a degradation of the just norms
of the common law which have elevated care, redress, deterrence and
knowledge of perils into our nation's consciousness.

